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Abstract— In this paper we address the problem of fully
distributed assignment of users to sub-bands such that the sum-
rate of the system is maximized. We introduce a modified auction
algorithm that can be applied in a fully distributed way using
an opportunistic CSMA assignment scheme and is  optimal.
We analyze the expected time complexity of the algorithm and
suggest a variant to the algorithm that has lower expected
complexity. We then show that in the case of i.i.d Rayleigh
channels a simple greedy scheme is asymptotically optimal as
SNR increases or as the number of users is increased to infinity.
We conclude by providing simulated results of the suggested
algorithms.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, there had been an accelerated deregulation of
spectrum usage. This can primarily be attributed to the success
of communication in the unlicensed 2.4GHz band and the large
markets created by devices operating there. A key factor in the
success of the mass deployment of devices in the unlicensed
bands is their ability to sense the spectrum and transmit over
various frequency bands. The technology that enables the
coexistence of different devices over the same frequency band
is called cognitive radio. There are three main models for
spectrum sharing in cognitive radio systems. The hierarchial
model, open sharing model and dynamic exclusive use model.
The hierarchial model, where secondary users are allowed to
use the spectrum when the primary users are not is the best
known. In this paper we focus on the open spectrum access
model where there are no primary users in the network. A good
overview of the various models of dynamic spectrum access is
given by Zhao and Sadler [3]. Here, cognitive radio systems
are defined as radio systems operating over multiple frequency
selective wireless channels in which users can change their
transmission or reception parameters to communicate without
interfering with other users. One way to avoid interference
between users sharing the same frequency band is to split
the spectrum into K orthogonal sub-bands using Orthogonal
Frequency Division Multiple Access (OFDMA). If users can
be assigned to sub-bands efficiently gains can be derived from
the diversity of the channel. This problem is known as the
channel assignment problem. The centralized assignment of
sub-carriers to users has been addressed extensively over the
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Parts of this paper had been presented in [1],[2]
last decade because of the high demand for efficient spectrum
utilization in wireless and wireline communication systems.
Papers that consider joint power and sub-carrier allocation in
the downlink direction include [4]-[6]. Sub-carrier allocation
methods in the uplink direction include [7]-[10].
The channel assignment problem is a special case of the
assignment problem. The assignment problem is a classical
optimization problem. The original formulation of the as-
signment problem is as follows: Given a matrix A find a
permutation matrix P that maximizes the trace tr(AP). The
first specialized algorithm to solve the assignment problem
was the Hungarian method suggested by Kuhn in 1955 [11].
Later, this method was generalized by Dantzig to solve general
linear programming problems [12]. All of the methods to
solve the assignment problem were centralized and required
full knowledge of the utility matrix. In 1979 a distributed
relaxation of the assignment problem called the auction al-
gorithm was introduced by Bertsekas [13]. It is called the
auction algorithm since it was inspired by auctions where
the users bid for objects and raise their bids until the highest
bidder wins the object. The auction algorithm did not require
full knowledge of the utility matrix but did need some kind
of explicit message passing mechanism or a shared memory.
Furthermore, the auction algorithm was shown to converge to
a solution which is at most N from the optimal solution
where N is the number of users and  > 0 is a small
constant chosen by the user. Furthermore, when utilities are
integers and  < 1N the assignment is optimal. The auction
algorithm has previously been suggested as a way to solve
the channel assignment problem. In [14] the auction algorithm
was used to solve the channel assignment problem for wireless
networks in the uplink direction. In [15] a distributed auction
algorithm with shared memory was used as a solution for
switch scheduling. In [16] it was shown that a modification of
the auction algorithm is equivalent to the max product belief
propagation. However, these modified auction algorithms also
required shared memory. Note that there is another class
of algorithms that are also called auction algorithms. These
algorithms rely mainly on economic principles and game
theory and are mainly aimed at fairness problems. Papers that
consider this type of auction algorithms include [17]-[21]. This
type of auction algorithm is not considered in this paper.
Another field of research dealing with optimal assignments
is the field of random assignments. Unlike the deterministic
approach to the assignment problem that is mainly concerned
with developing methods to find an optimal assignment, in
random assignment problems the statistical properties of the
optimal assignments are studied. The most widely known
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2result in this area is the conjecture by Mezard and Parisi
[22] that the expected value of a random linear minimum
assignment problem with i.i.d uniform [0, 1] or exponential
with a mean 1 cost coefficients approaches pi
2
6 as the size of
the problem goes to infinity. The conjecture was proven by
Aldous [23] in 2001. A simpler proof was found by Linusson
and Wa¨stlund [24] in 2004. A good review of the results
on random assignment problems is given in [25]. We use
Aldous’s theorem to provide tight estimates on the expected
time complexity of the auction algorithm.
Unlike cellular and optical systems that have centralized
access management, cognitive radio systems are inherently
distributed. In this case, centralized optimization methods
cannot be used and distributed channel assignment protocols
are needed to assign the users to the sub-channels. The
simplest protocol to implement in the distributed case is a
random channel assignment. However, it was shown in [26]
that for a large number of users, the relative loss of the
random allocation is at most 1logK , where K is the number of
channels. Recently there has been growing interest in spectrum
optimization for frequency selective channels. However, most
of the work done in this field relies on explicit exchange
of channel state information or channel statistics. Several
suboptimal approaches that do not require information sharing
have been suggested for the channel assignment problem. In
[27] a greedy approach to the channel assignment problem was
introduced. In [26],[28] the use of opportunistic carrier sensing
was combined with the Gale Shapley algorithm for stable
matching [29] to provide a fully distributed stable channel
assignment. That solution basically achieves a greedy channel
assignment.
In this paper we generalize the solution in [26] to the more
general case of fully distributed maximum weighted sum-
rate channel assignment where no explicit message passing
or shared memory is possible. We suggest a fully distributed
scheme that relies on a modified auction algorithm to solve
the distributed channel assignment problem using an oppor-
tunistic multi channel Carrier Sense Multiple Access (CSMA)
protocol. The suggested scheme does not require any explicit
message passing mechanism or shared memory and converges
to a solution within N from the optimal solution where N is
the number of users and  is a small scalar. We analyze the
expected complexity of the distributed auction algorithm. An
efficient variant of the distributed auction algorithm termed the
truncated distributed auction algorithm is introduced. We show
that the truncated auction algorithm is asymptotically optimal
when the number of users is large enough. We then analyze the
random channel assignment problem under Rayleigh channels.
We show that a randomized greedy assignment that converges
within one time frame is asymptotically optimal in both high
SNR, and as the number of users increases.
The paper is organized as follows: In section II we discuss
our model for the cognitive radio system and the spectrum
allocation problem. In section III we provide a brief overview
of the auction algorithm and introduce the fully distributed
auction algorithm that relies solely on local information.
We show that the modified auction algorithm shares some
important properties with the original auction algorithm such
as the bound on optimality. In section V we show how the
modified auction algorithm and opportunistic CSMA can be
combined to solve the distributed channel assignment problem
without using shared memory or a control channel. In section
VI we analyze the expected time complexity of the distributed
auction algorithm. In section VII we suggest an asymptotically
optimal variant to the distributed auction algorithm that has a
lower expected time complexity. In section VIII we analyze
a randomized greedy assignment scheme for i.i.d Rayleigh
fading channels and show that it is asymptotically optimal.
Finally we present some simulation results and conclusions.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a time slotted system of N cognitive users
using an unlicensed spectrum band divided into K sub-
channels. We assume all the users have continuous sensing
over all channels. R(n, k) is defined to be the average weighted
rate of user n in channel k.
R(n, k) = wn log2(1 + SNR(n, k)) (1)
where wn is the weight of user n and SNR(n, k) is the
signal to noise ratio of the n’th user in the k’th channel.
We assume that only one user can transmit on each channel
at each time slot and consider out of cell interferences as
noise. An illustration of the system model is given in Fig.
1. We are aiming for a distributed algorithm that finds an
Fig. 1. Cognitive radio pairs using an unlicensed band
assignment that maximizes the sum-rate of all users. The
maximum weighted sum-rate problem can be formulated as
an integer programming problem.
max
∑
m
∑
k
R(n, k)η(n, k)
s.t∑
k η(n, k) = 1, ∀n∑
n η(n, k) = 1, ∀k
η(n, k) ∈ {0, 1}, ∀n, k
(2)
3where η(n, k) ∈ {0, 1} equals 1 if the k’th channel is assigned
to the n’th user. The constraint matrix of this problem is
totally unimodular. This means that the solution to the relaxed
problem where we replace the integer constraint by η(n, k) ≥
0 is also the solution to the original problem. The relaxed
problem is a linear programming (LP) problem and can be
solved efficiently by LP solutions methods. The assignment
problem can be solved by specialized methods such as the
Hungarian Method [11]. However, most of the methods that
solve the assignment problem cannot be used easily in a
parallel and distributed manner.
III. THE AUCTION ALGORITHM
The auction algorithm [13] is an intuitive method for solving
the assignment problem. In many cases it has been shown to
converge faster than other methods for solving the assignment
problem [30]. Another advantage over other methods is that
it can be used in a distributed or parallel manner very easily.
Auctions in which unassigned people raise their prices and bid
for objects simultaneously was the original inspiration for the
auction algorithm. Similarly, the auction algorithm has two
stages, the bidding stage and the assignment stage. In the
bidding stage each unassigned individual raises the price of
the object he wishes to acquire by the difference between the
most profitable object and the second most profitable object
plus some constant . In the assignment stage every object is
assigned to the highest bidder. The two stages are repeated
until all bidders are assigned an object. More specifically, let
R be the matrix of the initial rewards. Let B be a matrix of
the bids. ρ is the price vector where ρk is given by:
ρk = max
n
B(n, k) (3)
Let η = [η1, η2, ..., ηN ] be an assignment (permutation) vector
where ηn is the object assigned to person n.
Definition 1: An object k is said to be assigned to person n
by η if ηn = k. The reward of the n’th person on assignment η
is denoted by R(n, ηn) and the price that the n’th person pays
on assignment η is denoted by ρηn . Given a positive scalar ,
an assignment η and a price ρηn , a person n is termed happy
with assignment η if the profit (i.e., reward minus price) is
within  of the maximal profit achievable by person n. This
condition is called -Complementary slackness (-CS).
R(n, ηn)− ρηn ≥ max
k
(R(n, k)− ρk)−  (4)
When all the people are assigned and happy, the algorithm
stops. It was shown in [13] that the algorithm terminates in
finite time. The algorithm is within N of being optimal at
termination [13]. Also, if the initial prices are all zeros and
N ≤ K the algorithm still converges in finite time and with
the same bounds on optimality. The original Bertsekas auction
algorithm is depicted in Table I. In [14] an algorithm based
on the auction method for two resource allocation problems
in uplink OFDMA networks was proposed. Both single-cell
and multi-cell scenarios were considered. In the single-cell
scenario the auction algorithm was applied in a centralized
manner at the base station. In the multi-cell scenario each
cell determines the assignment for its users using the auction
algorithm and sends the prices to its neighboring stations. This
process continues until multi-cell optimality is achieved. Note
that each person raises his bid by the difference between his
two most profitable objects. For that to be done, each user must
know the prices of the objects and the other user bids on each
iteration. In scenarios where no coordination between people is
possible, they have no way of knowing the other person’s bids
or the prices of the objects. Hence, fully distributed methods
are needed to solve the assignment problem when there is no
knowledge of the other person’s bids.
IV. THE DISTRIBUTED AUCTION ALGORITHM
The assumption in the original auction algorithm was that
all the people involved know the price of each object; i.e, the
highest bid. This assumption does not hold when designing
a distributed algorithm with no explicit communication be-
tween people. In this section we propose a fully distributed
version of the auction algorithm which does not require any
explicit message passing or a shared memory. Like the auction
algorithm, the distributed auction algorithm has two stages,
the bidding stage and the assignment stage. The distributed
auction algorithm can described as follows: Let R be an
N × K nonnegative reward matrix and let B be an N × K
bid matrix. In the initialization stage each person sets his bids
to be 0; i.e., B(n, k) = 0,∀n, k, select  > 0 and sets his
state to unassigned. As in the original auction algorithm, the
distributed auction algorithm is an iterative algorithm where
each iteration is composed of a bidding stage where people
raise their bids and an assignment stage where objects are
assigned to the highest bidders. In the bidding stage, each
unassigned person n find his most profitable object k˜n and
the profits from his most profitable object γn and his second
most profitable object ωn
k˜n = argmax
k
(R(n, k)− B(n, k))
γn = R(n, k˜n)− B(n, k˜n)
ωn = max
k 6=k˜n
(R(n, k)− B(n, k))
(5)
Each unassigned person raises the bid on his most profitable
object by
γn − ωn +  (6)
and then all the people bid on an object. If a person n is
assigned to object k he continues to bid on that object without
raising his bid. If a person n is unassigned he bids on k˜n
with the new bid B(n, k˜n). In the assignment stage each
object is assigned to the highest bidder. An object without
bids stays unassigned and people who were not assigned
to objects become unassigned. The bidding and assignment
stages proceed in iterations until all the people are assigned
to objects. Once all of the people are assigned to objects, no
one raises his bid and as a result the assignment becomes
static. When all the people are assigned we say that the
algorithm has converged. Note, that unlike the original auction
algorithm, in the distributed auction algorithm the prices of
the objects ρk are not known to the bidders. Hence, the
prices of the objects are determined locally by each bidder.
In the distributed scenario we replace ρk by B(n, k) which
4is the price that the n’th person is willing to pay for the
k’th object. As a result, in the distributed auction algorithm
the -CS condition is replaced by a local condition. We call
this modified condition Local -complementary slackness (L-
CS). The price that the n’th person pays on assignment η is
denoted by B(n, ηn) The L-CS condition with respect to an
assignment η and a bidding matrix B is defined by:
R(n, ηn)− B(n, ηn) ≥ max
k
(R(n, k)− B(n, k))−  (7)
This condition relies solely on local information and hence is
suitable for distributed algorithms. We will now prove that if
the L-CS condition is satisfied for all the people, -CS is also
satisfied for all the people.
Theorem 1: Given a feasible assignment η, a reward matrix
R and a bidding matrix B which satisfies L-CS for all people
then the -CS condition is also satisfied for all the people.
Proof:
If L-CS condition is fulfilled, then
R(n, ηn)− B(n, ηn) ≥ max
k
(R(n, k)− B(n, k))−  (8)
Since B(n, k) ≤ maxn(B(n, k)) it implies that
max
k
(R(n, k)− B(n, k)) ≥ max
k
(R(n, k)−max
n
(B(n, k))) =
= max
k
(R(n, k)− ρk)
(9)
where ρk is defined in (3). Therefore
max
k
(R(n, k)−B(n, k))−  ≥ max
k
(R(n, k)− ρk)−  (10)
On the other hand, since the assignment stage is the same
between the algorithms, an object is assigned to the highest
bidder. Hence, if an object k is assigned to person n it implies
that
B(n, ηn) = max
n
B(n, k) = ρηn (11)
Hence
R(n, ηn)− B(n, ηn) = R(n, ηn)− ρηn (12)
Substituting (12),(10) into (8) gives us
R(n, ηn)− ρηn ≥ max
k
(R(n, k)− ρk)−  (13)
which is the complementary slackness condition (4). This
means that any conclusion regarding -CS also applies to
L-CS. On particular, an assignment satisfying L-CS is N
optimal.
Theorem 2: The distributed auction algorithm converges to
a static assignment and a static set of prices within a finite
number of iterations.
Proof: The proof requires an adaption of [31] and is given
in appendix A.
The distributed auction algorithm appears in Table I.
A. Differences between the original auction algorithm and the
distributed auction algorithm
The main difference between the auction algorithm and the
distributed auction algorithm is the information used to make
a bid. In the auction algorithm each unassigned person needs
to know all the other people’s bids in order to make his bid.
In the distributed auction algorithm each unassigned person
relies solely on the local information available to determine
his bid. More specifically, in the original auction algorithm,
after each assignment phase each person knows the maximal
bid on all the objects. As a result if a person was unassigned
in the i’th iteration his next bid would be high enough so
that he would be assigned on iterations i + 1. However, in
the distributed auction algorithm, after each assignment phase
each bidder only knows if he was assigned or not. If he got
assigned he was the highest bidder and there is no need to
raise his bid. If he did not get assigned the bidder knows that
he was not the highest bidder and he needs to raise the bid on
his most profitable object. However, since each unassigned
person in the distributed auction algorithm raised his bid
solely according to his past bids there is no guarantee that
a person who was unassigned in the i’th iteration would get
assigned in iteration i+1 in the distributed auction algorithm.
Furthermore, the bidding results might differ between the
algorithms. However, Theorem 1 guarantees the convergence
of the distributed auction algorithm to a solution that is within
N from the optimal solution and Theorem 2 guarantees the
convergence of the distributed auction algorithm in finite time.
Up to this point we assumed N ≤ K. However, similar
to the algorithm in [32], the algorithm also converges when
N > K. The case of N > K is equivalent to the case of
N = K with N −K zero columns in R [32]. In that case if
there exists a person n where
R(n, k)− B(n, k) < 0,∀k ≤ N (14)
then
max
k
(R(n, k)− B(n, k)) = 0 (15)
this implies
R(n, ηn) = 0 (16)
which is equivalent to not being assigned at all. Hence, if the
profit from all the objects is negative the person stops bidding
and sets his state to assigned. Because of the equivalence
between the N > K case and the N = K with zero columns
case, the algorithm will converge to a solution within N from
the optimal solution.
V. APPLYING THE DISTRIBUTED AUCTION ALGORITHM
USING OPPORTUNISTIC CSMA
In this section we show how to implement the modified auc-
tion algorithm in a fully distributed manner using opportunistic
CSMA. Opportunistic CSMA [33] is a distributed transmission
protocol suggested for wireless sensor networks. The protocol
is made up of carrier sensing and a backoff strategy. Contin-
uous sensing of all channels by all users is assumed. Each
user in the network calculates a fitness measure ψn and maps
it to a backoff time τn based on a predetermined common
decreasing function f(ψn). Figure 2 shows an example of such
a backoff function. Each user listens to the channel he wants
to use and if no other user transmits before its backoff time
expires, the user is allowed to transmit. This protocol results in
the user with highest ψn transmitting in the channel. In other
words, this protocol can be used to determine the maximum
5TABLE I
AUCTION ALGORITHM AND DISTRIBUTED AUCTION ALGORITHM
Auction algorithm
Select  > 0, set all the people as unassigned and set
ρk = 0, n = 1..N
Repeat
1. Choose an unassigned person n
2. Calculate his maximum profit γn = maxk(R(n, k)− ρk)
3. Calculate the second maximum profit
k˜ = argmaxk(R(n, k)− ρk)
ωn = maxk 6=k˜(R(n, k)− ρk)
4. Assign object k˜ to person n. If this object has been
assigned to another person, make this
person unassigned (and as a result unassigned).
5. Set person n as assigned
6. Update the price of object k˜ to be
ρk˜ = ρk˜ + γn − ωn + 
Until all the people are assigned
Distributed auction algorithm
Select  > 0, set all the people as unassigned and set
B(n, k) = 0,∀n, k
Repeat
1. Each unassigned person n calculates its own maximum profit:
γn = maxk(R(n, k)− B(n, k))
2. Each unassigned person n calculates its second maximum profit:
k˜n = argmaxk(R(n, k)− B(n, k))
ωn = maxk 6=k˜n (R(n, k)− B(n, k))
3. Each unassigned user n updates the price of his best object k˜n
to be B(n, k˜n) = B(n, k˜n) + γn − ωn + 
4. All the users bid. The unassigned people bid on their new best
object with the updated bid. The assigned users bid on the last
object they bid on and with the same price.
5. Assign objects to the highest bidder (objects with no bids
stay unassigned)
Until all users are assigned
Fig. 2. An example of a function that maps better fitness to shorter time
of a vector in a distributed manner. In the distributed auction
algorithm the only coordination needed between users is an
auctioneer to decide which user made the highest bid. The
opportunistic CSMA can be used as an auctioneer. Since the
opportunistic CSMA protocol does not require any message
passing between users, it can be used to implement a fully
distributed solution on the maximum sum-rate problem. The
resulting assignment is within N from the optimal solution as
in the auction algorithm. We can define the reward that each
user n gets from channel k to be the achievable rate on that
channel R(n, k). Using the opportunistic CSMA scheme, each
user n tries to access his best profit channel defined by
k˜n = argmax
k
(R(n, k)− B(n, k)) (17)
with a backoff time of
τn = f(ρn,k˜n) (18)
where f(x) is a positive monotonically decreasing function.
The price B(n, k) is determined and updated if necessary as
described in section III. The prices and their corresponding
waiting times must converge in a finite number of iterations
TABLE II
DISTRIBUTED AUCTION ALGORITHM USING OPPORTUNISTIC CARRIER
SENSING
Select  > 0, each user sets himself as unassigned
and set B(n, k) = 0,∀k
Repeat
1. Each unassigned user n calculates its own maximum profit:
γn = maxk(R(n, k)− B(n, k))
2. Each unassigned user n calculates its own second maximum profit:
k˜n = argmaxk(R(n, k)− B(n, k))
ωn = maxk 6=k˜n (R(n, k)− B(n, k))
3. Each unassigned user n updates the price of his best channel k˜n
to be B(n, k˜n) = B(n, k˜n) + γn − ωn + 
4. Each unassigned user n maps the new best profit into
backoff time τn = f(B(n, k˜n))
5. Each user waits for τn milliseconds. If the user detects that
k˜n is free when its backoff time has expired, he
transmits his packet on k˜n and sets his state to assigned.
Until all users are assigned
as in the distributed auction algorithm. The distributed auction
algorithm for cognitive radio systems using opportunistic
CSMA is described in Table II.
Note that if the users are capable of measuring the back-off
times of the other users, the original auction algorithm can be
applied.
VI. UPPER BOUND ON THE EXPECTED NUMBER OF
ITERATIONS IN THE DISTRIBUTED AUCTION ALGORITHM
In Theorem 2 we proved that the distributed auction algo-
rithm converges in finite time. In this section we give an upper
bound on the expected number of iterations required for the
algorithm to converge to the optimal solution. We will first
prove the following simple lemma:
Lemma 3: LetR be an N×N nonnegative matrix. Let T be
the number of iterations until the distributed auction algorithm
converges and let Tn be the number of iterations in which user
n was unassigned; then
Tn ≤ K + 1

K∑
k=1
R(n, k) (19)
Proof: In each iteration in which the n’th user is unas-
signed he reduces his profit on his most profitable channel by
6at least . Hence, if
Tn = K +
1

K∑
k=1
R(n, k) (20)
then
R(n, k)− B(n, k) < 0,∀k (21)
and therefore
B(n, k) > 0,∀k (22)
which by Theorem 2 implies
T ≤ Tn (23)
and as a result
Tn ≤ K + 1

K∑
k=1
R(n, k) (24)
Theorem 4: Let R be an N × N i.i.d random matrix. Let
r > 0 be a nonnegative random variable with a Probability
Density Function (PDF) fr(r0) and assume for all n, k
fR(n,k)(r0) = fr(r0),∀n, k (25)
Let T be the number of iterations until the distributed auction
algorithm converges; then:
E (T ) ≤ 1

N2E(r) +N2 (26)
Proof:
The time it takes for the distributed auction algorithm until
all users are assigned is bounded by:
T ≤
N∑
n=1
Tn (27)
and by Lemma 3 we get
T ≤
N∑
n=1
K +
1

K∑
k=1
R(n, k) (28)
Taking the expected value gives us
E(T ) ≤ NK + 1

KNE(r) (29)
and since we assumed K = N
E(T ) ≤ N2 + 1

N2E(r) = O
(
1

N2E(r)
)
(30)
Note that as shown in [13], if R is integer valued and  < 1N
then the auction algorithm converges to the optimal solution.
Hence if R is a quantized matrix with quantization 1q the
choice of  < 1qN is sufficient to obtain the optimal solution.
TABLE III
TRUNCATED AUCTION ALGORITHM
1.Select  = 1
N
,each user sets himself as unassigned
2.Each user sets the prices for all channels
to zero B(n, k) = 0, n = 1..N, k = 1..K
3. Each user sets all the rates other than the best
α log2(N) best channels to 0
At the beginning of each time slot
1. Each unassigned person n calculates its own maximum profit
γn = maxk(R(n, k)− B(n, k))
2. Each unassigned person n calculates its own second maximum profit
k˜n = argmaxk(R(n, k)− B(n, k))
ωn = maxk 6=k˜n (R(n, k)− B(n, k))
3. Each unassigned user n updates the price of his best object k˜n
to be B(n, k˜n) = B(n, k˜n) + γn − ωn + 
4. Each unassigned user n maps the new best profit into
back-off time τn = f(B(n, k˜n))
5. Each user waits for τn milliseconds. If the user detects that
k˜n is free when its back-off time has expired, he
transmits his packet on the channel and sets his state to assigned.
VII. ASYMPTOTICALLY OPTIMAL AUCTION ALGORITHM
WITH REDUCED COMPLEXITY
As shown in the previous section, the expected time com-
plexity of the distributed auction algorithm is bounded by
O
(
1
N
2E(r)
)
. This complexity is too high for many practical
implementations. However, in real life systems there is a limit
on the maximal number of allowed bits per transmission.
We exploit this fact to devise a variation of the distributed
auction algorithm that has a reduced expected time complexity.
We call this variant ”the truncated auction algorithm” (TAA).
The TAA has a reduced worst case time complexity and
is asymptotically optimal under the assumption of bounded
maximal transmission rate per channel use. The TAA is the
same as the distributed auction algorithm with a simple change
of the rate matrix. In this variation of the distributed auction
algorithm each user maintains the rates of his best α log2(N)
channels in the rate matrix and replaces the rest of the rates in
the rate matrix with zeros. The distributed auction algorithm
is applied on the revised rate matrix. Note that our simulations
show that the expected convergence times of the distributed
auction algorithm and the TAA are the same. However, we can
prove this for the TAA. The algorithm is depicted in Table III.
The main result of this section is as follows:
Theorem 5: Let R be an N × N i.i.d random matrix. Let
r ∈ [0, a] be a nonnegative random variable with PDF fr(a) >
0 and assume that for all n, k
fR(n,k)(r0) = fr(r0),∀n, k (31)
Let Ropt be the sum-rate achieved by the optimal assignment
and let Rtrunc be the sum-rate achieved by the TAA using
only the best α log2(N) channels of each user where α > 1.
Then:
a) The expected time complexity of the TAA is bounded
by O
(
α
N log2(N)E(r)
)
b) E (Rtrunc) ≥
(
1− 1Nα−1
)
E (Ropt)
c) limN→∞E(Ropt)− E(Rtrunc) = 0
Proof:
We first prove 5-a. The proof is almost the same as the proof
to the bound on the expected time complexity of the distributed
7auction algorithm. In the TAA there are αN log2(N) nonzero
entries in the rate matrix instead of N2 nonzero entries in the
original distributed auction algorithm. As a result, in the TAA
using lemma 3 we get
E(T ) ≤
N∑
n=1
E(Tn) ≤ N2 + α

N log2(N)E(r) (32)
This concludes the proof of 5.a.
To prove 5-b we first show that the probability that the
assignment is obtained by the TAA using only the best
α log2(N) channels of each user is optimal with a probability
greater than 1 − 1Nα−1 . To prove 5-b we use the following
theorem proven in [23]:
Theorem 6: Let A be an N×N i.i.d matrix with a common
random variable X and PDF fX(x). If fX(0) > 0, the
probability that user i will get assigned to his k’th best channel
in the minimum assignment problem approaches 2−k for large
N .
It also follows from Theorem 6 that if X ∈ [a, b] and
fX(b) > 0 the same probabilities hold for the maximum
sum assignment problem since we can define a new random
variable Y = b−X where the minimum assignment for Y is
the maximum assignment for X . The probability that a user
will get assigned to one of his best k channels is
P (ci ≤ k) = 1− 2−k (33)
where ci is the rank of the assigned value to i’th user. The
probability that all users were assigned to one of their best k
channels in the optimal assignment is bounded by
P
(∩Ni=1P (ci ≤ k)) ≥ P (c1 ≤ k)− N∑
i=2
2−k =
= 1−N2−k
(34)
If we choose k = α log2(N) the probability that each user
will be assigned to one of his best k channels becomes:
P
(∩Ni=1P (ci ≤ k)) ≥ 1− 1Nα−1 (35)
This implies that the TAA will converge to the optimal
assignment with a probability greater than 1 − 1Nα−1 . Now,
if the truncated auction algorithm does not converge to the
optimal solution we assume that the resulting sum-rate is zero.
The above gives us the desired result
E (Rtrunc) ≥
(
1− 1
Nα−1
)
E (Ropt) (36)
This concludes the proof of part 5-b.
Part 5-c is trivially obtained from part 5-b by letting N go
to infinity.
VIII. ASYMPTOTICALLY OPTIMAL GREEDY ASSIGNMENT
IN RAYLEIGH FADING CHANNELS
In this section we show that in the case of i.i.d Rayleigh fad-
ing channels a simple randomized greedy assignment scheme
is asymptotically optimal. We also give an upper bound on
the expected rate loss per user using the greedy scheme.
The randomized greedy assignment is obtained by randomly
TABLE IV
RANDOMIZED GREEDY CHANNEL ASSIGNMENT
1) Set all users and channels as unassigned.
2) While there are unassigned users do:
a) Select a random user out of the unassigned users
b) Assign the selected user to his best unassigned channel
c) Set the user and channel as assigned.
3) Return to 2.
4) End
choosing unassigned users one at a time and assigning them to
their best channel out of the remaining unassigned channels.
The process is repeated until all the users are assigned. The
randomized greedy assignment scheme is shown in Table IV.
In this section we assume each channel is a Rayleigh fading
channel; i.e., the channel attenuation |hn(k)|2 is an exponential
random variable given by:
|hn(k)|2 = Gn · Fn · 1
rαn
(37)
where Gn is a global normalizing factor, Fn is an exponen-
tially distributed gain (due to the Rayleigh fading channel with
a multipath effect) and α is the path loss exponent; therefore:
f|hn(k)|2(x) =
rαn
Gn
e−
rαn
Gn
x (38)
and
fSNRn(k)(x) = λne
−λnx (39)
where
λn =
σ2nr
α
n
pn ·Gn (40)
The rate of user n in channel k is given by [34]:
Rn(k) = log (1 + SNRn (k)) (41)
The cumulative distribution function of R(k) is given by:
FR(k)(y) = FSNR(e
y − 1) = 1− e−λ(ey−1) (42)
Let Rl:K be the l’th smallest random number out of K
random numbers. The expected Rl:K is given by [35]:
E (Rl:K) =(
K
l
)∑l
m=1
(
l
m
) (−1)m+1m
K−l+m e
λ(K−l+m)E1(λ(K − l +m))
(43)
where E1(·) is the exponential integral defined by:
E1(x) =
∫ ∞
x
e−t
t
dt (44)
The following lemmas are needed for the proof of the asymp-
totical optimality of the greedy scheme in i.i.d Rayleigh fading
channels.
Lemma 7: Assume R is an N×N i.i.d matrix with random
rates defined in equation (41). Then the expected sum-rate
of the greedy assignment scheme in i.i.d Rayleigh fading
channels is given by:
L =
K∑
m=K−N+1
m∑
j=1
(
m
j
)
(−1)j+1ejλE1(jλ) (45)
8Proof: The k’th assigned user gets assigned to his best
channel out of N −k+1 available channels unconditioned on
the previous picks. This is true because the users are picked in
a random order. The expected sum-rate of the greedy scheme
is given by:
K∑
m=K−N+1
Rm:K (46)
and by substituting (43) into (46) we get
K∑
m=K−N+1
m∑
j=1
(
m
j
)
(−1)j+1ejλE1(jλ) (47)
Lemma 8: Assume R is an N×N i.i.d matrix with random
rates defined in equation (41). An upper bound on the expected
optimal assignment is given by:
U = N
K∑
m=1
(
K
m
)
(−1)m+1emλE1(mλ) (48)
Proof:
The proof is trivial since it is the expected sum-rate when
assuming each user was assigned to his best channel every
time. This is of course an upper bound on the optimal
assignment.
We now show that the greedy scheme is asymptotically
optimal in both low and high SNR regimes.
A. Asymptotic optimality in the low SNR regime
In this section we analyze the performance of the greedy
scheme in low SNR and show that it is asymptotically optimal
for i.i.d Rayleigh channels. To analyze the performance of
the greedy scheme in the low SNR regime we assume for
simplicity that N = K. However, the analysis holds for any
N ≤ K.
Theorem 9: Assume R is an N × N i.i.d random matrix.
Each element in the matrix is defined as in (41) and L,U
defined in (45), (48); then in the low SNR regime:
lim
SNR→0
(
U − L
U
)
≤ 1
HN
− 1
N
(49)
where HN is the N ’th harmonic number defined by:
HN =
N∑
k=1
1
k
(50)
Proof:
We use the following known bounds on E1(mλ) [36]
1
2e
−mλ log
(
1 + 2mλ
)
< E1(mλ) <
< e−mλ log
(
1 + 1mλ
) (51)
In low SNR 1mλ << 1 and
1
mλ
− 1
2m2λ2
≤ log(1 + 1
mλ
) ≤ 1
mλ
(52)
In that case the bounds are tight and we can bound E1(mλ)
by
e−mλ
(
1
mλ
− 1
2m2λ2
)
≤ E1(mλ) ≤ e−mλ 1
mλ
(53)
Using [37] the bounds can be bounded by:
U ≤ N
N∑
m=1
(
N
m
)
(−1)m+1 1
mλ
=
N
λ
HN
L ≥
N∑
m=1
m∑
j=1
(
m
j
)
(−1)j+1
(
1
mλ
− 1
2m2λ2
)
=
=
N∑
m=1
(
Hm
λ
−
(
ζ(2)−H(2)m
4λ2
)
− (Hm)
2
4λ2
) (54)
where H(2)N is defined by:
H
(2)
N =
N∑
k=1
1
k2
(55)
We can now give an upper bound on the relative error of
the bounds by computing the relative difference between the
upper and lower bounds. The relative difference in low SNR
is given by:
U − L
U
≤
∑N
m=1HN −Hm
NHN
+
+
1
4λNHN
N∑
m=1
(
pi2
6
−H(2)m + (Hm)2
)
≤
≤ 1
HN
− 1
N
+
+
1
4λ
(
HN +
pi2
6HN
− (N + 1)H
(2)
N+1 −HN+1
NHN
)
≤
≤ 1
HN
− 1
N
+
HN
λ
(
1
8
+
pi2
54
)
(56)
and for any fixed N when SNR→ 0
lim
λ→∞
(
U − L
U
)
≤ 1
HN
− 1
N
(57)
Furthermore, since HN is diverging, if HN = o(λ):
lim
N→∞
(
U − L
U
)
= 0 (58)
This implies that the bounds are asymptotically tight in the
low SNR regime as the number of users grows. This also
implies that the greedy scheme is asymptotically optimal as
the number of users goes to infinity.
B. Asymptotic optimality in the high SNR regime
We now analyze the performance of the greedy scheme in
the high SNR regime.
Theorem 10: Assume R is an N ×N i.i.d random matrix.
Each element in the matrix is defined as in (41) and L,U
defined in (45), (48); then in the high SNR regime for any
N ≥ 2 the following holds:
a)
lim
λ→0
(U − L) = c ≤
≤ (N − 1) log log(N − 1) + γ + 1
log(N)
+
+ (N − 2)
(
γ
(
1
log(N)
− 1
log(2)
)
− log log(2)
)
(59)
9b) limSNR→∞
U−L
U = 0
Proof:
The series representation of E1(mλ) is given by:
E1(mλ) = −γ − log(mλ)−
∞∑
l=1
(−mλ)l
ll!
(60)
where γ is Euler’s constant. In the high SNR case, mλ << 1
and we can bound E1(mλ) by
− γ − log(mλ) ≤ E1(mλ) ≤ −γ − log(mλ) +mλ (61)
Using these bounds we can now show that the difference be-
tween the higher and lower bound is asymptotically constant.
The bounds in the high SNR are approximately:
U ≤ −N(γ + log(λ))
(
1− (1− eλ)N)+
+N
N∑
m=1
(
N
m
)
(−1)memλ log(m)+
+N2λeλ
(
1− eλ)N−1
L ≥ −(γ + log(λ))
N∑
m=1
(
1− (1− eλ)m)+
+
N∑
m=1
m∑
j=1
(
m
j
)
(−1)jejλ log(m)
(62)
The difference between the higher and the lower bound is
bounded by:
U − L ≤ −N (γ + log (λ)) (1− eλ)+
+N
N∑
m=1
(
N
m
)
(−1)memλ log(m)+
+N2λeλ
(
1− eλ)N−1−
−
N∑
m=1
m∑
j=1
(
m
j
)
(−1)jejλ log(j)
(63)
and as the SNR goes to infinity, using the results from [37]
we obtain:
lim
λ→0
(U − L) ≤ N
N∑
m=1
(
N
m
)
(−1)m log(m)−
−
N∑
m=1
m∑
j=1
(
m
j
)
(−1)j log(j) = c ≤
≤ (N − 1) log log(N − 1) + γ + 1
log(N)
+
+ (N − 2)
(
− log log(2) + γ
(
1
log(N)
− 1
log(2)
))
(64)
c is a constant independent of λ. This shows that the bounds
are tight in the high SNR regime as well since:
lim
SNR→∞
c
U
= 0 (65)
This implies that the greedy scheme is asymptotically optimal
in the high SNR regime regardless of the number of users.
Note that the expression in (64) could be used to give an
estimate on the total or the relative error of the bounds in any
SNR.
IX. SIMULATIONS
In this section we report some simulated results of the
algorithms suggested in this paper. We first show the average
sum-rate achieved by the distributed auction algorithm and
compare the results with the auction algorithm where the bids
are known to all users. We consider a system with m = 10
users and k = 10 channels. The rates R(n, k) are random rates
in Rayleigh fading channels SNR = 20db. In Fig. 3 we show
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Fig. 3. Average distance from optimality as a function of 
a comparison between the average results of both algorithms
at termination as a function of . It is easy to see that both
algorithms are within M of being optimal. As  gets larger,
both algorithms converge to a value that is better than the
stable matching greedy solution. However, the degradation of
the distributed algorithm is faster as a function of .
Fig. 4 shows the average number of iterations until conver-
gence as a function of the sum-rate achieved by the algorithms.
The average number of iterations needed for the distributed
auction algorithm to achieve the same performance as the
auction algorithm is only larger by a small constant than
the number of iterations needed for the auction algorithm
for convergence. This suggests that the number of iterations
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needed by both algorithms to converge has the same order of
10
magnitude. Note that different values of  should be picked
by both algorithms to get the same results.
In the next simulations we compare the performance of
the truncated auction algorithm and the distributed auction
algorithm. Fig. 5 shows the comparison between the outage
probability and the upper bound on outage probability as
a function of the number of users N using only the best
2 log2(N) order statistics. As expected the probability is lower
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Fig. 5. Probability that the optimal assignment has at least one entry which
is not one of the best 2 log2(N) order statistics
than 1N . Figure. 6 shows the average number of iterations
needed for the distributed auction algorithm and the truncated
auction algorithm until convergence. The average number of
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Fig. 6. Expected number of iterations of the distributed auction algorithm
and the truncated auction algorithm.
iterations in the truncated auction algorithm and the distributed
auction algorithm is almost the same. This implies that al-
though it was not proven in this paper, upper bounds on the
number of iterations in the truncated auction algorithm also
hold for the distributed auction algorithm with a full rate
matrix.
In the next set of simulations we show a comparison
between the expected rates achieved by optimal assignment
and the rates achieved by the greedy algorithm in i.i.d Rayleigh
fading channels. Fig 7 shows the upper bound on the expected
relative error of bounds in the low SNR scenario. In the next
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Fig. 7. Upper bound on the relative error on the expected optimal assignment
in low SNR.
set of simulations we simulated a system of 10 channels and 10
users with i.i.d Rayleigh channels. Fig 8 compares the optimal
channel assignment and the greedy scheme. As expected, the
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Fig. 8. Comparison between the average optimal channel assignment and
the bounds.
difference between the upper bound and the greedy bound is
constant in high SNR and converges to 0 at low SNR.
Fig 9 show the relative difference between the bounds and
the asymptotic relative difference in low SNR. One can easily
see that as expected, the relative difference goes to zero as
SNR increases. Furthermore, at a SNR of 30db, which is the
average working SNR of WiFi networks, the average sum-
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rate of the greedy scheme is 95% of the upper bound on the
optimal assignment.
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Fig. 9. Asymptotic behavior of the relative difference between the upper
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X. CONCLUSION
In this paper the problem of fully distributed channel
assignment was addressed. The distributed auction algorithm
was introduced. The distributed auction algorithm can be
implemented in a fully distributed manner and is -optimal.
We showed that the distributed auction algorithm shares the
same optimality properties as the original auction algorithm.
A variant of the distributed auction algorithm dubbed the
truncated auction algorithm was introduced and was shown
to be asymptotically optimal under mild conditions on the
distribution of the random matrix. We then analyzed the
optimal assignment in i.i.d Rayleigh fading channels and
showed that a randomized greedy scheme is asymptotically
optimal with a large number of users or when the SNR is
sufficiently high. We then showed simulated results of the
algorithms developed in here and compared their performance
with the upper and lower bounds derived in the paper.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of theorem 2
In this appendix we follow the proof from [31] and show
that for a feasible problem and for any positive value of ,
the distributed auction algorithm terminates with a feasible
assignment which is within M of being optimal in a finite
number of iterations. We assume in this proof that the number
of people is at most equal to the number of objects, as this
condition can always be achieved by adding dummy zero
objects. The proof relies on the following facts:
1) In the auction algorithm as well in the distributed auction
algorithm a bidding and assignment phase can result in a
reassignment of an already assigned object to a different
person, but cannot result in the object becoming unas-
signed. Therefore when an object is assigned, it remains
assigned throughout the remainder of the algorithm’s
duration. Furthermore, except at termination, there will
always exist at least one object that has never been
assigned, and has a price equal to its initial price.
2) Each time an object receives a bid, its local price
increases by at least . Therefore, if an object receives
a bid an infinite number of times, its price increases to
∞ for at least one person.
3) Every |A(i)| bids per person m, where A(i) is the set of
objects user i can make bids on and |A(i)| is the number
of objects in A(i); the best object value νi defined by
νi = max
j∈A(i)
(aij − pij) (66)
decreases by at least . The reason is that a bid by
person i either decreases νi by at least , or else leaves
νi unchanged because there is more than one object j
attaining the maximum. However, in the latter case, the
price of the object ji receiving the bid will increase by
at least , and object ji will not receive another bid by
person i until νi decreases by at least . The conclusion
is that if a person i bids an infinite number of times, νi
must decrease to −∞.
We now argue by contradiction. If termination did not occur,
the subset J∞ of objects that received an infinite number of
bids is nonempty. Also, the subset of persons I∞ that bid
an infinite number of times is nonempty. As argued in 2), the
prices of the objects in J∞ must tend to∞, while as argued in
3) above, the scalars νi = maxj∈A(i)(aij−pij) must decrease
to −∞ for all persons i ∈ I∞. Therefore, aij − pij tends to
−∞ for all j ∈ A(i), implying that
A(i) ⊂ J∞,∀i ∈ I∞ (67)
The L-CS condition states that aij − pij ≥ νi +  for every
assigned pair (i, j); thus after a finite number of iterations, each
object in J∞ can only be assigned to a person from I∞. Since
after a finite number of iterations at least one person from I∞
will be unassigned at the start of each iteration, it follows that
the number of people in I∞ is strictly larger than the number
of objects in J∞. This contradicts the existence of a feasible
assignment, since people in I∞ can only be assigned to objects
in J∞. Therefore, the algorithm must terminate. The feasible
assignment obtained upon termination satisfies L-CS (since
the algorithm preserves L-CS throughout); hence by theorem
1, this assignment is within M of being optimal.
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